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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MANUEL JACUINDE,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 48246-2020
Minidoka County Case No. CR34-20-66

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Manuel Jacuinde failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it
revoked Jacuinde’s probation and retained jurisdiction?
ARGUMENT
Jacuinde Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
A.

Introduction
On or about January 3, 2020, a law enforcement officer entered a Walmart restroom, where

Jacuinde had locked himself inside one of the bathroom stalls with store merchandise from which
he had removed the packaging. (PSI, p. 3.) The officer commanded Jacuinde to open the door,
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but Jacuinde refused. (Id.) When the officer forced entry, he informed Jacuinde that he was under
arrest. (Id.) Jacuinde fought with the officer but was eventually placed in handcuffs. (Id.) A
search of Jacuinde’s person revealed unpurchased items from Walmart, marijuana, a syringe, and
methamphetamine. (Id.)
The state charged Jacuinde with possession of methamphetamine in violation of I.C. § 372732(c)(1), possession of marijuana in violation of I.C. § 37-2732(c)(3), possession of drug
paraphernalia in violation of I.C. § 37-2734A, petit theft in violation of I.C. §§ 18-2403(1) and 182407(2), and resisting and/or obstructing an officer in violation of I.C. § 18-705. (R., pp. 26-29.)
Jacuinde pled guilty to the first count, possession of methamphetamine. (R., pp. 31-35.) The court
imposed a five-year sentence with two years determinate. (R., p. 55.) The court suspended
Jacuinde’s sentence and placed him on probation for a period of three years. (Id.) Thereafter,
Jacuinde violated the terms of his probation by failing to report to his probation officer (Tr., p. 11,
L. 9 – p. 12, L. 2), living in an unapproved residence (Tr., p. 12, L. 9-21), consuming alcohol (Tr.,
p. 14, Ls. 1-5), and using marijuana and methamphetamine (Tr., p. 14, Ls. 9-19). The court
revoked probation and retained jurisdiction. (R., p. 80.)
Jacuinde timely appealed. (See R., pp. 80, 83.)
B.

Standard Of Review
“Review of a probation revocation proceeding involves a two-step analysis. First, it is

determined whether the terms of probation have been violated. If they have, it is then determined
whether the violation justifies revocation of the probation.” State v. Garner, 161 Idaho 708, 710,
390 P.3d 434, 436 (2017) (citations omitted). As to the first step, a “court’s finding that a violation
has been proved will be upheld on appeal if there is substantial evidence in the record to support
the finding.” State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923, 71 P.3d 1065, 1070 (Ct. App. 2003) (citations
2

omitted). “As to the second step, the decision whether to revoke a defendant’s probation for a
violation is within the discretion of the district court.” Id. (citations omitted). 1
In evaluating whether a lower court abused its discretion, the appellate court conducts a
four-part inquiry, which asks “whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the
exercise of reason.” State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 272, 429 P.3d 149, 160 (2018) (citing
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).
C.

Jacuinde Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion
“In determining whether to revoke probation a court must examine whether the probation

is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and is consistent with the protection of society.” State v.
Hanson, 150 Idaho 729, 733, 249 P.3d 1184, 1188 (Ct. App. 2011). Courts act within their
discretion to revoke a defendant’s probation when the defendant’s violations demonstrate that
probation is not serving its rehabilitative purpose. See, e.g., State v. Cornelison, 154 Idaho 793,
798-99, 302 P.3d 1066, 1071-72 (Ct. App. 2013) (affirming probation revocation due to
defendant’s use of alcohol and marijuana and failure to report because probation was not serving
the goal of rehabilitation); Hanson, 150 Idaho at 733, 249 P.3d at 1188 (affirming probation
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Jacuinde does not challenge the first element of the court’s analysis (whether he violated the
terms of his probation) but solely argues the second element (whether the district court abused its
discretion in revoking probation). (See Appellant’s brief, p. 3.) Any argument with respect to the
first element is therefore waived. See State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970
(1996) (“When issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument,
they will not be considered.”); Gallagher v. State, 141 Idaho 665, 669, 115 P.3d 756, 760 (2005)
(“When the opening brief contains no authority on an issue presented, it is immaterial that the party
provides authority either in a reply brief or in supplemental briefing because the issue had already
been waived.”). And, in any event, Jacuinde admitted the violations at the revocation hearing.
(Tr., p. 11, L. 9 – p. 14, L. 22.)
3

revocation because the violations demonstrated probation was not achieving rehabilitation and that
defendant’s heavy drinking posed a risk to society); State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923, 71 P.3d
1065, 1070 (Ct. App. 2003) (affirming probation revocation when defendant missed an
appointment with his probation officer, used drugs and alcohol, and failed to attend substance
abuse counseling).
The district court’s decision to revoke probation was reasonable. The court properly
considered whether probation was serving its intended purpose of rehabilitation and whether
revoking probation was consistent with protecting society. (See Tr., p. 23, Ls. 4-15.) While
Jacuinde did not pose “a huge risk to society,” Jacuinde nonetheless did harm society through his
criminal conduct, for instance a theft in Cassia County. (Tr., p. 23, Ls. 9-14.) And more
importantly, probation was not achieving rehabilitation. (See Tr., p. 23, Ls. 4-15.) The court
considered Jacuinde’s many violations committed soon after probation commenced. In violation
of the terms of his probation, Jacuinde had failed to report to his probation officer three times,
lived in an unapproved place, and used alcohol, marijuana, and methamphetamine. (Tr., p. 11, L.
9 – p. 14, L. 22.) The court reasoned that the violations showed that probation was not serving its
rehabilitative purpose. (See Tr., p. 22, L. 18 – p. 23, L. 15.) Given Jacuinde’s long history of
substance abuse and introduction to substance abuse at a young age, he could have a “long path to
recovery” and would likely benefit from “dry time” in custody and participation in courses in the
rider program. (Tr., p. 22, Ls. 8-17; p. 24, Ls. 1-6.) Jacuinde’s violations are indistinguishable
from those in cases where the district court appropriately revoked probation. See Cornelison, 154
Idaho at 798-99, 302 P.3d at 1071-72; Hanson, 150 Idaho at 733, 249 P.3d at 1188; Knutsen, 138
Idaho at 923, 71 P.3d at 1070.
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Jacuinde argues that the district court abused its discretion by revoking probation “in light
of the mitigating factors” of (1) Jacuinde’s drug addiction and willingness to seek treatment, and
(2) his remorse. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 3-4.) Jacuinde is incorrect.
First, the district court by no means ignored Jacuinde’s substance abuse problem. On the
contrary, the court tailored its decision to Jacuinde’s needs. Jacuinde committed the underlying
offense while he was high. (PSI, p. 4.) Then, almost immediately after beginning probation,
Jacuinde violated his probation terms by using alcohol and drugs, which in turn apparently caused
other violations, namely failing to report to his probation officer. (Tr., p. 19, Ls. 1-6.) This pattern
of behavior demonstrated that probation was not helping Jacuinde change his course. Further, this
case is distinguishable from the case on which Jacuinde relies. (Appellant’s brief, p. 4 (citing State
v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 645 P.2d 323 (1982).) In Nice, the court reduced a defendant’s sentence
when the defendant, who had a problem with alcohol, was working and helping to support his
children at the time of the offense. 103 Idaho at 91, 645 P.2d at 325. Here, Jacuinde had been
unemployed for about a year and a half by the time of the presentencing investigation and only
“pays his bills when he can.” (PSI, pp. 10, 13.) Given this information, he presumably did not
support his three children, who lived in Texas with their mother. (PSI, p. 9.) Jacuinde’s situation
is also removed another step from Nice because drinking alcohol to excess (as the Nice defendant
did) is not in itself illegal, while possession of marijuana and methamphetamine is itself a criminal
act.
Second, the district court adequately considered any remorse that Jacuinde expressed. (Tr.,
p. 12, Ls. 1-2 (“I do apologize.”); PSI, p. 4 (stating that he felt “[r]emorseful for the pain I may
have caused anyone affected by my drug use/crime”).) Certainly, the district court does not abuse
its discretion whenever the defendant says he is sorry, and the court declines to do what the
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defendant requests. And this case is nothing like Alberts, the case on which Jacuinde relies. (See
Appellant’s brief, p. 4 (citing State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 824 P.2d 135 (Ct. App. 1991).) In
Alberts, the court determined that the district court abused its discretion by requiring two sentences
for sexual abuse to be served consecutively, when the defendant lacked psychopathic deviancy,
displayed “a great deal of remorse,” was willing to accept treatment, and exhibited other “positive
attributes of . . . character.” 121 at 205, 208, 824 P.2d at 135-36, 139. The Alberts opinion had
nothing to do with revoking probation, a material difference given that a sentencing decision
considers re-offense as a potential future risk, see id. at 205-06, 824 P.2d at 136-37, but here reoffense had already occurred, despite any expressions of remorse. See State v. Kerr, 115 Idaho
725, 726, 769 P.2d 602, 603 (Ct. App. 1989) (affirming probation revocation when defendant
violated his probation by breaking the law in Utah).
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 19th day of May, 2021.

/s/ Jennifer Jensen
JENNIFER JENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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